

How Has Fukushima Changed the Future of the Nuclear Industry?



Roundtable / Dinner



Nuclear Energy Insider:
U.S. Plant Safety Enhancements
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Linton Consulting

How Has Fukushima Changed the Future of the Nuclear Industry?



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Why Are We Here?



- ◆ Knowledge exchange
 - Assess state of Nuclear Industry, post Fukushima
 - Big Picture View
- ◆ Share insights / perspectives
 - Governments
 - Operators / Licensees
 - Vendors & Contractors
 - Associations, consultants
- ◆ Timely issues with a lot of associated questions
 - Regulator directives / orders
 - Impact on operating plants
 - Impact on future designs

Situation Analysis



- ◆ On March 11, the “unthinkable” happened
 - Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan
 - Fukushima Daiichi NPP site blackout & subsequent accident
- ◆ Ensuing weeks...
 - Serious for country of Japan and local population
 - Earthquake & tsunami was big disaster
 - But nuclear accident severe: radioactive releases
- ◆ Considered one of three worst
 1. Chernobyl
 2. Fukushima
 3. Three Mile Island

“ ...public confidence in the safety of nuclear power was badly damaged by the Fukushima accident “ - IAEA

Situation Analysis



- ◆ Before Fukushima there was concern that an accident of even lesser magnitude would kill the nuclear renaissance
- ◆ Has not proven to be true
 - Energy/electricity is too big an issue
 - Without coal, no other base load sources
 - High growth countries need nuclear power
 - Some 40 countries have confirmed support for Nuclear
 - Only a few in Europe will exit
- ◆ Yet there has been a pause for re-evaluation
- ◆ Lessons-learned are now being applied
- ◆ New build proceeding in China, U.S., Russia, elsewhere...

“An accident anywhere is an accident everywhere”

Situation Analysis



- ◆ Because of potential impact, government, industry and private entities began assessments of the lessons learned
- ◆ These included:
 - IAEA
 - US-NRC and most other country regulators
 - WANO
 - INPO
 - EPRI
 - NEI
- ◆ Most utilities also designated personnel to follow the event, its lessons and develop safety recommendations
- ◆ INPO, EPRI and NEI assembled a leadership team and published “The Way Forward”

Key Questions




- ◆ How have the 3 major nuclear accidents (and many others less severe) in history impacted the industry?
 - Three Mile Island
 - Chernobyl
 - Fukushima
- ◆ An accident anywhere is an accident everywhere...has this proven to be true?
- ◆ What has/will be the impact on industry structure, owners/licenseses, regulators and coordination bodies?
 - Utilities (private, public, quasi)
 - Japanese regulators, NRC, etc.
 - IAEA
 - WANO, INPO, NEI, WNA, etc.

Will Fukushima Reduce Nuclear?



◆ Share of Nuclear in U.S. Over Time



Key Questions




- ◆ What *strategic* changes will we see from Fukushima?
 - Implications for country energy policies
 - Generation mix
 - Plant siting (location, elevation, etc)
 - Plant configurations (number of units)
 - Size of units (SMRs, etc.)
 - Reactor designs and technologies (LWR/BWR, fuel cladding, etc.)
 - Alternate fuel cycles (thorium, etc.)
- ◆ What are the implications for spent fuel?
 - Cooling, storage technologies
 - For waste repositories
- ◆ For any other aspects of the supply chain?

Key Questions



- ◆ What are the new expectations for emergency preparedness and response?
- ◆ What is the importance of command and control during a major catastrophe? How is it accomplished?



What Are the Lessons-Learned?



◆ Risk Assessment

- Prevent nuclear accidents at all costs
- Threat re-assessment
- Safety vulnerability assessments
- Improved designs, operations, governance

◆ Regulation & Compliance

- Surveillance and oversight
- Testing of emergency equipment
- Improve advance warning systems

“Thou shall not construct NPPs on shaky grounds or in shaky countries”

◆ Emergency Preparedness

- Should accident occur, mitigate risks and consequences
- Contingency planning by each constituent
- Option planning in advance

IAEA Conclusions

- ◆ Protection Against Extreme Events
 - Earthquakes, tsunamis, flooding, tornadoes
 - Terrorist activity
- ◆ Impacts / Consequences
 - Total station blackout
 - Loss of reactor cooling
 - Loss of spent fuel pool cooling
 - Loss of communications
- ◆ Recommendations
 - Enhancing emergency response capabilities
 - Hydrogen explosion control
 - More robust instrumentation for monitoring



Industry “Flex Strategy”



- ◆ Developed by U.S. industry as another layer of security
- ◆ *Flexible* because each site can plan for greater probability extreme events in its locale
- ◆ Relies on portable equipment, some stationed offsite
- ◆ Types of equipment:
 - Pumps
 - Generators
 - Battery banks
 - Chargers
 - Compressors
 - Hoses
 - Small Diesel Generators
 - Diesel-driven pumps
 - Fire trucks
 - Portable ventilation
 - Communication equipment
 - Diesel fueling equipment

NRC Conclusions



◆ Fukushima Task Force Recommendations

- Develop additional strategies to cope with external events / station blackout
 - Better protect portable safety equipment
 - Obtain sufficient equipment to support all reactors at a site simultaneously
- Install reliable, hardened vents for BWRs (Mark I & II)
- Install enhanced instrumentation for monitoring fuel pools

◆ Interim Staff Guidance Documents

- Open for public comment through July 7; finalize in August
- Compliance deadline December 31, 2016

◆ 3-Tier implementation of recommendations including earthquake and flooding walk downs

NRC Tier 1: Immediate Action



- ◆ Seismic & flood hazard re-evaluations and walkdowns
- ◆ Station blackout regulatory actions
- ◆ Mitigating strategies for beyond design basis events
- ◆ Reliable hardened vents for Mark I & II containments (BWRs)
- ◆ Stronger & integrated emergency procedures, severe accident and damage mitigation guidelines
- ◆ Emergency preparedness regulatory actions



NRC Tier 2: Next Actions



- ◆ Spent fuel pool makeup capability
- ◆ Emergency preparedness regulatory actions
- ◆ Other external hazards re-evaluation
 - Tornadoes
 - Hurricanes
 - Drought
 - Etc.



NRC's reaction to Fukushima has been considered a conservative, measured response

NRC Tier 3: Actions After More Study



- ◆ 10-year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards
- ◆ Potential enhancements to prevent or mitigate fires & floods
- ◆ Reliable hardened vents
- ◆ Emergency preparedness enhancements for station blackout and multi-unit events
- ◆ Emergency response data system capability
- ◆ Reactor oversight process modifications
- ◆ Additional staff training
- ◆ Basis of EPZ
- ◆ Pre-staging of potassium iodide beyond 10 miles
- ◆ Transfer of spent fuel to dry cast storage



**“ I believe that nuclear power plants
have already become safer as a result of
measures taken as outlined in the action
plan on nuclear safety” -- Denis Flory
IAEA**

One Utility's Status



- ◆ Assigned full-time corporate position
- ◆ Site positions also (may be part-time)
- ◆ Doing Evaluations
 - Totally busy time
 - Prioritization of sites, actions
- ◆ Budgeting and planning
- ◆ Scheduling actions
 - 1 year, 2 year, 3year

Emergency Preparedness



◆ Pre – Accident

- Prevent at all costs
- Improved designs, operations, governance
- Surveillance and oversight
- Testing of emergency equipment
- Improve advance warning systems
- Dependable communications

◆ Response Preparedness

- Should accident occur, mitigate risks and consequences
- Contingency planning by each constituent
- Option planning in advance



“Thou shalt not construct NPPs on shaky grounds or in shaky countries”

Emergency Preparedness



- ◆ During
 - Response teams mobilize
 - Implement pre-arranged action scenarios
 - Fit for purpose: demographic, external conditions
 - Importance of command & control
 - Importance of communications
 - Reporting, transparency
- ◆ Post – Accident
 - Stabilization
 - Removal & clean up of contamination
 - Others

Changing Roles, Missions



- ◆ WANO has announced mission change
 - Shift from prevention only, to include Emergency Preparedness
 - Improving integrated response of government and industry to nuclear emergencies
- ◆ INPO role during Fukushima, after
 - Organized an emergency supply chain network to assist in getting equipment to site
 - Consortium of utilities, vendors, etc.
 - Will INPO also announce an expanded mission?
- ◆ IAEA taking a stronger role
- ◆ Need for strong global governing body?

Linton Consulting

Insights for Industry and Government



Linton Consulting

Who Is Linton Consulting?



- ◆ A professional practice providing independent insights and advisory services to industry and government
- ◆ Focus: Energy, Power, Nuclear
- ◆ Business strategy, diversification, market development, trend analyses, scenarios and visioning
- ◆ Executive relationships and introductions
- ◆ Strategic View
 - Process develops high level insights on the future state
 - Ongoing analyses and executive interviews
- ◆ Services leading to sound business strategies, decisions, plans and implementation
- ◆ Partner with UxC, *Nuclear Energy Insider*, and InnovaNet

What is *Strategic View*?




◆ Research model

- Used 15 years; 5 in energy
- Forces affecting the future of the energy industry
- Industry responses
- Where it is leading – the future state/outcomes

◆ Process

- Interviews with executives and thought leaders
- Research & analysis
- Executive Roundtable
- Follow up & plan integration



Executive Roundtables



◆ Common purpose

- Convene executives and thought leaders for knowledge exchange
- Expand understanding
- Share perspectives
- Confirm/challenge paradigms
- Advise leadership
- Uncover ideas and opportunities for your organization
- Explore Future – trends and challenges
- Establish practical, realistic path forward



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